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Abstract
Spatial wage disparities can result from spatial diﬀerences in the skill composition of
the workforce, in non-human endowments, and in local interactions. To distinguish be-
tween these explanations, we estimate a model of wage determination across local labour
markets using a very large panel of French workers. We control for worker characteris-
tics, worker ﬁxed eﬀects, industry ﬁxed eﬀects, and the characteristics of the local labour
market. Our ﬁndings suggest that individual skills account for a large fraction of existing
spatial wage disparities with strong evidence of spatial sorting by skills. Interaction eﬀects
are mostly driven by the local density of employment. Not controlling for worker hetero-
geneity leads to very biased estimates of interaction eﬀects. Endowments only appear to
play a small role.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, spatial disparities are large and a source of considerable policy concern. In this
paper we propose a new approach to account for spatial wage disparities. We implement it on a
large panel of French workers.
To explain large spatial wage disparities, three broad sets of explanations can be proposed. First,
diﬀerences in wages across areas could directly reﬂect spatial diﬀerences in the skill composition of
the workforce. There are good reasons to suspect that workers may sort across employment areas so
that the measured and un-measured productive abilities of the local labour force vary. For instance,
industries are not evenly distributed across areas and require diﬀerent labour mixes so that we
expect a higher mean wage in areas specialised in more skill-intensive industries. Such skills-based
explanations essentially assume that the wage of worker i is given by wi = Asi, where si denotes
individual skills and A, the productivity of labour, is independent of location. Consequently, the
average wage in area a is the product of average skills, sa, by the productivity of labour: wa = Asa.1
The second strand of explanations contends that wage diﬀerences across areas are caused by
diﬀerences in local non-human endowments (hereafter endowments). For instance, workers in some
areas may have a higher marginal product than in others because of geographical features such as a
favourable location (like a port or a bridge on a river), a climate more suited to economic activity,
or some natural resources. Arguably, local endowments cannot be restricted to natural features
and should also encompass factors of production such as public or private capital, local institutions,
and technology. More formally, this type of argument implies that in area a with endowments Ea
aﬀecting positively the productivity of labour, the wage is given by wa = A(Ea).2
The third family of explanations argues that some interactions between workers or between ﬁrms
take place locally and lead to productivity gains. Interactions-based explanations have a wealth of
theoretical justiﬁcations. Following Marshall (1890), denser input-output linkages between buyers
and suppliers, better matching of workers' skills with ﬁrms' needs in thicker labour markets, and
technological externalities resulting from more intense direct interactions are frequently mentioned
(see Duranton and Puga, 2004, for a review).3 A key issue is whether these beneﬁts stem from the
size of the overall market (urbanisation economies) or from geographic concentration at the industry
level (localisation economies). Stated formally, these arguments imply that the mean wage in area
a and industry k is given by wa,k = A(Ia, Ia,k), where Ia and Ia,k are two vectors of interaction
variables to capture urbanisation and localisation economies.4
We are not aware of any work using individual data considering these three strands in a uniﬁed
framework. This is the main purpose of this paper. In our speciﬁcation, we allow skills, endowments,
and interactions to determine local wages. More formally, our model implies that in equilibrium the
wage of worker i in area a(i) and industry k(i) is given by wi = A(Ea(i), Ia(i), Ia(i),k(i))si.
1That sorting could be at the root of systematic wage diﬀerences between groups of workers is a long-standing
concern of labour economists. They researched this question intensively in the case of wage diﬀerences across industries
(Krueger and Summers, 1988; Gibbons and Katz, 1992; Abowd et al., 1999) but they have mostly left aside the
geographic dimension. On the other hand, scholars interested in regional issues have paid remarkably little attention
to this type of explanation. Glaeser and Maré (2001) on the urban wage premium in us cities and Duranton and
Monastiriotis (2002) on uk regional convergence stand out as early exceptions.
2This (very) broad group of explanations is often at the heart of the work done by growth economists. The
literature on this topic is extremely voluminous (see Durlauf and Quah, 1999, and Temple, 1999, for surveys).
3The theories relying on input-output linkages and more generally on market access diﬀer starkly with respect
to the spatial scale they consider. The traditional focus of urban economics is the city whereas that of the `New
Economic Geography' (Fujita et al., 1999) is more regional and even inter-regional. We pay attention to these issues
below.
4Interaction-based explanations have received a lot of attention from urban and regional economists. Work on
agglomeration economies is usually done at the aggregate level by regressing a measure of local productivity on a set
of variables relating to the extent and local composition of economic activity. Results are generally supportive of the
existence of both localisation and urbanisation economies. See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a review.
1
A uniﬁed framework encompassing skills-, endowments-, and interactions-based explanations
should provide us with a sense of magnitudes about the importance of these three types of expla-
nations in determining wage disparities across areas. These magnitudes are crucial to inform policy
and to guide future theoretical work. Unfortunately, a uniﬁed framework also imposes formidable
data requirements. More speciﬁcally, to deal properly with skills-based explanations we must control
for unobserved worker heterogeneity, which requires a panel of workers. In our empirical analysis,
we use a large panel of French workers.
We develop a two-stage approach. The ﬁrst stage of the regression allows us to assess the im-
portance of skills-based explanations against those highlighting true productivity diﬀerences across
areas (i.e., between-industry interactions and endowments-based explanations). Formally, we regress
individual wages on time-varying worker characteristics, a worker ﬁxed eﬀect, an area-year ﬁxed ef-
fect, an industry ﬁxed eﬀect, and a set of variables relating to the local characteristics of the industry
(to capture local interactions within industries). The area-year ﬁxed eﬀects can be interpreted as
local wage indices after controlling for observed and unobserved worker characteristics and industry
eﬀects. Our main result is that diﬀerences in the skill composition of the labour force account for
40 to 50% of aggregate spatial wage disparities. This occurs because workers sort across locations
according to their measured and unmeasured characteristics: The correlation between the local mean
of worker ﬁxed eﬀects and de-trended area ﬁxed eﬀects (which are computed controlling for worker
ﬁxed eﬀects) is large at 0.29. This suggests that previous approaches, which typically do not pay
much attention to the sorting of workers across areas, are likely to suﬀer from an important omitted
variable problem.
In the second stage of the regression, we use the area ﬁxed eﬀects estimated in the ﬁrst stage
and regress them on a set of time dummies, several variables capturing local interactions between
industries, and some controls for local endowments. We use a variety of panel data techniques
and instrumental variables approaches to deal with estimation concerns. Our ﬁndings point ﬁrst at
substantial local interactions despite the importance of sorting. Urbanisation economies (measured
by the density of local employment) play the most important role. Market access plays a less
important part, while endowments play a weak role. Second, controlling for sorting halves standard
estimates of the intensity of agglomeration economies. Our favourite estimate for the elasticity of
wages with respect to employment density is at 3%. Third, after controlling for skills and interactions,
residual spatial wage disparities are smaller than disparities in mean wages by a factor of around
three. This result is consistent with a major role for skills-based explanations, a moderate role for
interactions, and a weak role for endowments.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst document wage disparities between French
employment areas in the next section. Then, in Section 3 we propose a general model of spatial
wage disparities. In Section 4, this model is estimated on individual data to assess the importance
of skills-based explanations. In Sections 5 and 6, we discuss the issues relating to endowments-
and interactions-based explanations and assess their importance. In Section 7, we reproduce our
regressions using aggregate data. Finally some conclusions are given in Section 8.
2 Wage disparities across French employment areas
The data is extracted from the Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales (dads) or Annual Social
Data Declarations database. The dads are collected by the French Institute for Statistics (insee)
from all employers and self-employed in France for pension, beneﬁts and tax purposes. A report must
be ﬁlled by every establishment for each of its employees so that there is a unique record for each
employee-establishment-year combination. The extract we use covers all employees in manufacturing
and services working in France and born in October of even-numbered years.
The raw data contains 19, 675, 740 observations running from 1976 to 1998. For each observation,
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Table 1: Some simple correlations
Mean local wage in 1998 (logwa,98) as a function of:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logDensitya,98 logEmpa,98 logDiversitya,98 Skilla,98
Intercept 5.720a 5.147a 5.329a 5.352a
(0.014) (0.025) (0.037) (0.006)
Coeﬃcient 0.049a 0.049a 0.047a 1.763a
(0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.085)
R2 0.51 0.34 0.04 0.56
341 observations. Standard error between brackets. Densitya,t is the density of employment in employment
area a and year t; Empa,t is total employment; Diversitya,t is the diversity of employment as measured by
an inverse-Herﬁndhal index, Diversitya,t = Emp2a,t/
∑
k Emp
2
a,k,t where subscript k denotes the industries;
and Skilla,t is the employment share of professionals. c: signiﬁcant at 10%, b: signiﬁcant at 5%, and a:
signiﬁcant at 1%.
we have some basic personal data (age, gender, occupation at the one-digit level but not education),
basic establishment level data (including location and ﬁrm industry at the three-digit level), number
of days worked, and various measures of earnings. For consistency with the model below, we focused
only on total labour costs for full-time employees deﬂated by the French consumer price index. We
refer to the real 1980 total labour cost per full working day as the wage.
Workplace location is identiﬁed at the level of employment areas ('zones d'emploi'). Continental
France is fully covered by 341 employment areas, whose boundaries are deﬁned on the basis of daily
commuting patterns. Most employment areas correspond to a city and its catchment area or to a
metropolitan area. Although the data is of high quality, we carefully avoided a number of pitfalls.
After cleaning the data (see Appendix A for details), we ended up with 8, 826, 422 observations. For
reasons of computational tractability, we keep only six points in time (every four years: 1976, 1980,
1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996). This left us with 2, 664, 474 observations when estimating the model
on individual data.
Using this data, we can brieﬂy document the extent and persistence of wage disparities between
employment areas in France. Typically, in and around Paris wages are on average 15% higher than
in large French cities such as Lyon or Marseille, 35% higher than in mid-sized French cities, and
60% higher than in predominantly rural employment areas. To be more systematic, we computed
a series of inequality measures between employment areas. The ratio of the highest average to the
lowest across all French employment areas remains between 1.62 and 1.88 during the 1976 − 1996
period. The ratio of the ninth to the ﬁrst decile is between 1.19 and 1.23. Finally, the coeﬃcient
of variation also remains between 0.08 and 0.09. All this points to rather large and persistent wage
disparities between French employment areas.
Table 1, columns 1−4 reports ordinary least squares (ols) estimates suggesting that local wages
are strongly linked to the structural attributes of their employment area. Column 1 regresses the
log of the mean local wage in 1998 on the log of the local density of employment in the same year.
The coeﬃcient indicates an elasticity of 4.9% (as typically found in the literature). The explanatory
power of this single variable is very strong since the R2 is 51%. Similar results are obtained in column
2 when using total employment instead of density. In column 3, local wages are regressed on an index
of industrial diversity. The eﬀect of this variable is also highly signiﬁcant but its explanatory power
is much weaker. Finally, regressing local wages in column 4 on the share of workers in professional
occupations also yields very good results.
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3 Theory and estimation
The model
The proﬁt of a competitive representative ﬁrm operating in employment area a and industry k in
year t is:
pia,k,t = pa,k,t ya,k,t −
∑
i∈(a,k,t)
wi,t `i,t − ra,k,t za,k,t, (1)
where pa,k,t is the price of its output ya,k,t. For any worker i employed in this ﬁrm in year t, wi,t
and `i,t are the daily wage and the number of working days, respectively. Finally, za,k,t represents
the other factors of production and ra,k,t their price. Note that this speciﬁcation allows for inputs
and output markets to be segmented or integrated (when pa,k,t = pk,t and/or ra,k,t = rk,t). Output
is Cobb-Douglas in eﬀective labour and the other factors of production:
ya,k,t = Aa,k,t
 ∑
i∈(a,k,t)
si,t `i,t
b (za,k,t)1−b , (2)
where the coeﬃcient b is such that 0 < b ≤ 1, si,t denotes the skills of worker i in year t, and Aa,k,t
is the total factor productivity in (a, k, t). At the competitive equilibrium, worker i employed in
employment area a(i, t) and industry k(i, t) in year t receives a wage equal to her marginal product:
wi,t = b pa(i,t),k(i,t),tAa(i,t),k(i,t),t
(
za(i,t),k(i,t),t∑
i∈(a,k,t) si,t `i,t
)1−b
si,t. (3)
Using the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximisation with respect to the other factors and inserting
it in equation (3) yields:
wi,t = b(1− b)
(1−b)
b
(
pa(i,t),k(i,t),t
Aa(i,t),k(i,t),t(
ra(i,t),k(i,t),t
)1−b
) 1
b
si,t
= Ba(i,t),k(i,t),t si,t.
(4)
Wage diﬀerences across areas can reﬂect diﬀerences in individual skills or alternatively they can
also reﬂect true productivity diﬀerences caused by endowments and local interactions. Skills (using
this word as a shorthand for all the ﬁxed individual attributes which are rewarded on the labour
market) are captured by the last term, si,t, in equation (4) whereas the other two explanations enter
the term Ba,k,t in equation (4). As made clear by this latter term, `true productivity diﬀerences' can
work through total factor productivity, Aa,k,t, or through the price of outputs, pa,k,t, or even through
the price of non-labour inputs, ra,k,t. This implies that we cannot identify price and technology eﬀects
separately.5 Note further that some local characteristics like employment density may have a positive
eﬀect on Ba,k,t (e.g., agglomeration economies) as well as a negative eﬀect (e.g., congestion). We are
not able to identify these eﬀects separately. We can only estimate the overall eﬀect of a variable.
5To understand this point better, consider for instance employment area a, which is located in a mountainous
region, and industry k. Mountains may have a negative eﬀect on wages in (a, k) because shipping the ﬁnal output
of the industry to the main consumer markets is more expensive, which depresses f.o.b. prices. Mountains may
have another direct negative eﬀect on wages in (a, k) because operating a plant is more diﬃcult when land is not
ﬂat. Finally mountains may have a positive eﬀect on wages because some raw materials such as wood may be more
readily available. In this toy example, the ﬁrst eﬀect works through pa,k,t, the second through Aa,k,t, whereas the
third goes through ra,k,t. With our approach, we can only estimate the overall eﬀect of local characteristics, the
presence of mountains say, in area a and industry k. In other words, we can identify the determinants of spatial
wage disparities (i.e., endowments, interactions, and skills) but not the exact channel through which agglomeration
economies percolate. See Duranton and Puga (2004) and Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for further discussion of this
classic problem in the agglomeration literature.
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A micro-econometric speciﬁcation
To take equation (4) to the data, we need a speciﬁcation for both the skill term, si,t, and the `local
industry productivity' term, Ba,k,t. Assume ﬁrst that the skills of worker i are given by:
log si,t = Xi,tϕ+ δi + i,t, (5)
where Xi,t is a vector of time-varying worker characteristics, δi is a worker ﬁxed eﬀect, and i,t is a
measurement error. The errors are assumed to be i.i.d. across periods and workers.
Turning to Ba,k,t, which reﬂects true productivity diﬀerences in equation (4), we assume that it
is given by:
logBa,k,t = βa,t + µk,t + Ia,k,tγk, (6)
where βa,t is an area-year ﬁxed eﬀect, µk,t is an industry-year ﬁxed eﬀect, and γk is the vector
of coeﬃcients associated with Ia,k,t, the vector of within-industry interactions variables for each
area-industry-year.6
Combining equations (4), (5), and (6) yields:
logwi,t = βa(i,t),t + µk(i,t),t + Ia(i,t),k(i,t),tγk(i,t) +Xi,tϕ+ δi + i,t. (7)
In equation (7) the interpretations of Ia,k,tγk and Xi,tϕ are problematic. For instance, an industry
may employ younger workers. If wages increase with age, this industry will pay lower wages all
else equal. We want to think of such systematic industry component as being part of the `industry
eﬀect'. As a consequence, we centre Ia(i,t),k(i,t),t andXi,t around their industry mean. The systematic
industry components in Ia,k,tγk and Xi,tϕ are added to the industry ﬁxed eﬀect to form a `total
industry eﬀect'. For tractability, we also need to limit the number of coeﬃcients in the model and
assume that the time trend is the same for all industries so that this total industry eﬀect can be
decomposed into an industry ﬁxed eﬀect and a year eﬀect (which can be normalised to zero for
all years since the temporal evolution is also captured by the area-year ﬁxed eﬀect).7 The ﬁnal
speciﬁcation for the ﬁrst stage of the analysis is thus:
logwi,t = βa(i,t),t + µk(i,t) + I˜a(i,t),k(i,t),tγk(i,t) + X˜i,tϕ+ δi + i,t. (8)
where I˜a(i,t),k(i,t),t is the centred vector of within-industry interactions variables and X˜i,t is the
centred vector of individual time-varying characteristics.
Equation (8) corresponds to an inverse labour demand equation.8 To sum up, we estimate the
wages of workers (expressed in constant 1980 francs) as a function of their observed and unobserved
6Note that in equation (6), it might seem simpler to use area-industry-year ﬁxed eﬀects rather than area-year ﬁxed
eﬀects plus industry-year ﬁxed eﬀects. However there would be two problems with doing this. First, it would force
us to include more than 200, 000 ﬁxed eﬀects in the model (341 employment areas × 99 industries × 6 years). These
would come in addition to the worker ﬁxed eﬀects introduced in equation (5). Estimating such a large number of
worker and area-industry ﬁxed eﬀects is computationally too demanding. Furthermore, many of these ﬁxed eﬀects
would be estimated with a very small number of workers (if any at all). This would raise some problems of both
identiﬁcation and statistical signiﬁcance.
7Formally, the eﬀects of within-industry interactions, Ia,k,tγk, can be decomposed into an industry speciﬁc com-
ponent independent of location, I,k,tγk, and a component net of national industry eﬀects, I˜a,k,tγk ≡ (Ia,k,t− I,k,t)γk
where I,k,t is the mean of the Ia,k,t weighted by local employment in the industry (I,k,t = 1Nk,t
∑
a∈(k,t)Na,k,tIa,kt
where Na,k,t is employment in area a, industry k and year t and Nk,t is total employment in industry k in year t).
Similarly the eﬀect of age can be decomposed into an industry speciﬁc component X,k(i,t),tϕ and a component net of
national industry eﬀect X˜i,tϕ ≡ (Xi,t−X,k(i,t),t)ϕ. The total industry eﬀect is thus µk,t+I,k,tγk+X,k,tϕ. This con-
sists of the industry eﬀect as deﬁned above, plus a national average industry interaction eﬀect and a national average
composition eﬀect (in terms of workers' observable characteristics). Then we assume: µk,t+I,k,tγk+X,k,tϕ = µk+ρt.
Finally, since it is not possible to identify ρt and βa,t separately, we normalise ρt to zero for all years.
8A competitive wage-setting mechanism is assumed. Any imperfect competition framework where the wage is a
mark-up on marginal productivity would lead to similar results since in a log speciﬁcation this mark-up would enter
the constant or the industry ﬁxed eﬀects if such mark-ups vary between industries but not between areas. In France,
there is some empirical support for the competitive/ﬁxed-mark-up assumption (see Abowd et al., 1999).
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characteristics (age and its square plus a worker ﬁxed eﬀect), the area in which they are employed
(area-year ﬁxed eﬀects), their industry (industry ﬁxed eﬀects), and the local characteristics of their
industry: log share of employment, log number of establishments, and share of workers in professional
occupations. The local share of employment and the number of establishments are standard variables
appearing in most models of localisation economies (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). The share of
professionals in the industry is a proxy for the average education locally in the industry. This should
capture the external eﬀects of human capital in the local industry in the spirit of the literature on
human capital externalities (Moretti, 2004).
This estimation allows us to identify separately the eﬀects of 'people' (skills-based explanations)
versus those of `places' (endowments- and interactions-based explanations).9 It also allows us to
assess the respective explanatory power of the eﬀects of skills (X˜i,tϕ+ δi), of within-industry inter-
actions (I˜a,k,tγk), and the joint explanatory power of endowments and between-industry interactions
(βa,t). The second stage of the estimation then uses βa,t as dependent variable. It is presented in
detail in Section 5.
Identiﬁcation, estimation method and estimation issues
To identify the sector ﬁxed eﬀects in equation (8), we need enough mobility across sectors so that
all industries are `connected' with each other (at least indirectly) through worker ﬂows. The iden-
tiﬁcation of area-year eﬀects is slightly more subtle. Workers that move across areas provide the
identiﬁcation of the diﬀerences between areas over time. Workers that stay identify changes over
time for their area. Hence to identify area-year eﬀects we need (i) some workers remain in each
of the employment areas between any two consecutive dates and (ii) there is no area or group of
areas with no worker ﬂow to the rest of the country. Given the amount of data we have, all these
conditions are easily met.10 Since area-year ﬁxed eﬀects are identiﬁed only relative to each other
(just like industry ﬁxed eﬀects), some identiﬁcation constraints are necessary. We set the coeﬃcients
for Central Paris in 1980 and that for the meat industry to zero.
Although helpful for identiﬁcation, our very large number of observations (with a very large
number of worker ﬁxed eﬀects) restricts us to a simple estimation procedure for this ﬁrst stage. We
estimate equation (8) using the within estimator.11
In our econometric speciﬁcation, the choice of area and industry is assumed to be strictly exoge-
nous. Nonetheless, since our speciﬁcation contains both area-year ﬁxed eﬀects and industry ﬁxed
eﬀects, this assumption should not be too restrictive. It is discussed in Appendix B. In essence, our
results will be biased if we have spatial or industry sorting based on the errors but they will not be
biased if sorting is based on the explanatory variables, including individual, area-year, and industry
ﬁxed eﬀects. More concretely, there is a bias when the location decision is driven by the exact wage
that the worker can get at locations in a given year but there is no bias when workers base their
location decision on the average wage of other workers in an area and their own ﬁxed eﬀects, i.e.,
when they make their location decision on the basis of their expected wages.12
9We do not consider the case where individuals may beneﬁt diﬀerently from local labour markets depending on
their abilities. An analysis of speciﬁc beneﬁts from worker-area matches would require to deﬁne some individual ﬁxed
eﬀects that are area-speciﬁc. This is beyond the scope of this paper. Our aim is only to capture the average beneﬁts
from locating in a given place through area ﬁxed eﬀects. Provided mobility is exogenous, our results will be unbiased.
The broader issue of how endogenous worker mobility may aﬀect our results is discussed below.
10See the working paper version of this article and Abowd et al. (1999) for further details about identiﬁcation.
11Since there is a very large number of ﬁxed eﬀects to estimate, we proceed as follows. We ﬁrst estimate (8)
`within' individual, that is all variables being centred with respect to their mean for each individual. This gives us
the coeﬃcients on all variables except the worker ﬁxed eﬀects. Next, we can recover an estimator of each worker ﬁxed
eﬀect by computing his or her mean prediction error. By the Frish-Waugh theorem, this is the ols estimator for the
individual ﬁxed eﬀect. Note that only workers appearing at least twice in the panel contribute to the estimation. This
leaves us with 653, 169 workers representing 2, 221, 156 observations.
12As in standard Roy models, a bias will also arise if the returns to the time-varying unobserved characteristics
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If this selection bias is relevant, we can think of several reasons why it is likely to be much
attenuated. First, in a country like France with numerous barriers to internal mobility, we expect
migration to be driven mostly by long-term considerations. Provided the local shocks are uncorre-
lated over time, there is then no bias since workers migrate on the basis of future expected wages
rather than the wage they can get today (Topel, 1986). Second, we also expect location decisions
to be driven by factors unrelated to wages such as idiosyncratic preferences. Using the European
Household Panel Survey, Gobillon and Le Blanc (2003) report that only 22% of long-distance moves
in France are related to a new job. Third, with time-varying local eﬀects and industry ﬁxed eﬀects,
we expect much of the variation caused by the environment to be captured. This should limit the
scope of selection. Finally, Dahl (2002) proposes a new approach to deal with selection problems
with many possible choices, but this can be applied to cross-section data only and we do not know
of any method to correct for such selection biases in panel. He shows that this type of selection bias
has only minimal eﬀects on the estimates of the returns to education across us states.
Some concerns also arise with the characteristics of the local industries in Ia,k,t. As discussed by
Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone (2002), some local characteristics like a high level of speciali-
sation in an industry could be endogenous to high wages in this industry. We leave these concerns
aside here on the ground that these variables only have a small explanatory power (see below).
Similar concerns with respect to between-industry interactions will be tackled in the second-stage
estimation.
Finally, according to Abowd et al. (1999) a wage equation with industry ﬁxed eﬀects should
also contain establishment ﬁxed eﬀects. This is because these ﬁxed eﬀects may be correlated with
industry ﬁxed eﬀects. This also applies to area ﬁxed eﬀects. Such a correlation would bias the
estimates when establishment ﬁxed eﬀects are omitted. However the method developed by Abowd
et al. (1999) to deal with large scale matched employer-employee data (using both worker and plant
ﬁxed eﬀects) would not allow us to compute the standard deviations for the estimated area ﬁxed
eﬀects that are necessary to perform the second stage of the estimation correctly. This approach
would also lack theoretical foundations since area ﬁxed eﬀects would then have to be computed
by calculating a weighted average of establishment ﬁxed eﬀects by location. A ﬁnal problem with
this alternative approach is that establishment ﬁxed eﬀects are constrained by the estimation to
be constant over time. The resulting area ﬁxed eﬀects constructed by aggregating time-invariant
establishment ﬁxed eﬀects can then evolve only through the entry and exit of establishments and
internal changes in employment and not by changes in interactions and endowments.
4 Skills and sorting across employment areas using individual data
This section presents the results for the estimation of equation (8). Recall that the explanatory vari-
ables are the area-year ﬁxed eﬀects, the industry ﬁxed eﬀects, the worker ﬁxed eﬀects, the worker's
age and its square, the log share of local industry employment, the log number of establishments,
and the share of professionals. Note that in absence of education data, worker ﬁxed eﬀects will cap-
ture all the permanent characteristics of workers including their education. Since we are interested
in the eﬀects of skills rather than their determinants, this is not an issue provided the coeﬃcients
are properly interpreted. We ﬁrst present a variance analysis and our results about sorting before
commenting on the coeﬃcients.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the variance decomposition  estimation of equation (8)
Simple correlation with:
Eﬀect of Std dev logw 000δ00 β − θ
log real wage (logw) 0.367 1.00 0.78 0.26
residuals () 0.166 0.45 0.00 0.00
worker eﬀects (δ +Xϕ) 0.294 0.80 0.98 0.09
000worker ﬁxed eﬀects (δ) 0.284 0.78 1.00 0.10
000age (Xϕ) 0.058 0.23 0.08 0.00
industry ﬁxed eﬀects (µ) 0.043 0.25 0.16 0.05
within-industry interactions (I˜kγk) 0.024 −0.01 0.00 −0.45
000within-industry share of professionals 0.011 0.16 0.12 0.29
000within-industry establishments 0.019 −0.13 −0.08 −0.62
000specialisation 0.017 0.03 0.02 −0.13
area ﬁxed eﬀects (β) 0.140 0.34 −0.05 0.55
000de-trended area ﬁxed eﬀects (β − θ) 0.065 0.26 0.10 1.00
000time (θ) 0.118 0.26 −0.11 0.10
2, 221, 156 observations. All correlations between the eﬀects that are not orthogonal by deﬁnition are signiﬁ-
cant at 1%.
The eﬀect of within-industry share of professionals is that of the share of professional times its coeﬃcient (in
vector γk). The eﬀect of within-industry establishments is that of the log of the number of establishments
times its coeﬃcient. The eﬀect of specialisation is that of the log of the industry share in employment times
its coeﬃcient. Area ﬁxed eﬀects are de-trended using the time ﬁxed eﬀects (θ) estimated in the second stage.
The importance of workers' skills
Our ﬁrst set of results suggests, unsurprisingly, that workers' skills are of fundamental importance
and play a much greater role than the local environment and the industry in the determination of
individual wages. To show this, we perform a complete variance analysis as in Abowd et al. (1999).
Table 2 shows the explanatory power of the diﬀerent variables for the baseline regression. For each
variable or group of variables, the Table reports the standard deviation of their eﬀect and their
correlation with wages, worker ﬁxed eﬀects and de-trended area ﬁxed eﬀects.
To construct this Table, we computed the eﬀect of each variable by multiplying its coeﬃcient by
its value for each observation. For instance, consider worker i in (a, k, t). The eﬀect of specialisation
is equal to the estimated coeﬃcient on this variable for industry k times the specialisation of area a
in this industry. For a group of variables, the sum of the eﬀects is computed. Then, the variability
of the eﬀect of each variable across workers can be calculated. When the eﬀect of a variable has a
large standard deviation and it is highly correlated with wages, this variable has a large explanatory
power. When on the contrary the eﬀect of variable has a small standard deviation and a small
correlation with wages, this variable explains only a small fraction of the variations of wages.
Worker ﬁxed eﬀects have by far the largest explanatory power. Their standard deviation (0.284)
is close to that of log wages (0.364) and the correlation between worker ﬁxed eﬀects and wages is
very high at 0.78. For no other variable, or group of variables, are the standard deviation and the
correlation with wages as high. When looking at the eﬀects of observable worker characteristics, it
is worth noting that age and its square also have a moderate explanatory power with a standard
deviation of 0.058 and a correlation of 0.23 with log wages. Altogether, with a standard deviation of
diﬀer across areas and workers choose their location accordingly. In this respect note that a primary objective of our
paper is to decompose spatial disparities. Considering that spatial diﬀerences in individual productivity could have
multiple dimensions would make such decomposition much more cumbersome and far less transparent. We believe
that it is better to consider only one dimension for a ﬁrst pass on the issue.
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Table 3: Spatial wage disparities, 1976− 1996 average
Mean wage Net wage
(Max-Min)/Min 0.74 0.38
(P90−P10)/ P10 0.21 0.14
(P75−P25)/ P25 0.11 0.06
Coeﬃcient of variation 0.08 0.05
Mean wage refers to the de-trended mean wage by employment area. Net wages are calculated as in equation
(9). Max, Min, P10, P90, P25, and P75 are the max, the min, the ﬁrst decile, the last decile, the ﬁrst quartile,
and the last quartile, respectively.
0.294 and a correlation of 0.80 with wages, the combined eﬀect of individual observed and unobserved
characteristics is of overwhelming importance.
Turning to within-industry interactions, their explanatory power is very small. The standard
deviation of the eﬀect of all within-industry interaction variables together is less than a tenth of
that of worker ﬁxed eﬀects. Furthermore, the correlation between log wages and the eﬀect of within-
industry interactions is close to zero. Within this group of variables, neither the share of professionals,
the number of establishments nor specialisation particularly stands out.
Finally, the explanatory power of area-year ﬁxed eﬀects is substantial, albeit much less so than
that of worker ﬁxed eﬀects. Because wages increased everywhere in real terms between 1976 and
1996, a good fraction of the area ﬁxed eﬀects is explained by the time trend over the period. After
taking away this trend however, area ﬁxed eﬀects still have an explanatory power more important
than that of industry, age, or within-industry interactions. Although this result was to be expected,
this is rather interesting in light of the small amount of attention location factors have received so
far in the labour literature relative to industry and age.
Spatial wage disparities and sorting
To evaluate the importance of workers' skills on spatial wage disparities, we can also study the
variations of a wage index net of worker and industry eﬀects. This `net wage' is computed from
the results of equation (8). It corresponds to the local wage obtained by an `average' worker in an
`average' industry. We can deﬁne such an index wnet,a,t, which we refer to as the net wage, in the
following way:
logwnet,a,t ≡Wt + β̂a,t, (9)
where Wt is a normalising time-dependant term such that wnet,a,t can be interpreted as a wage.
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These net wages can then be compared with the real mean wages per area computed in Section
2. Table 3 compares systematically disparities in mean and net wages. Depending on the inequality
measure taken, disparities in net wages may be as low as half of those in mean wages. Put diﬀerently,
workers' skills explain 40 to 50% of spatial wage disparities.
This result is caused by a strong sorting pattern whereby workers with high ﬁxed eﬀects tend to
live in the same areas. To go further on this issue, it is interesting to correlate the average worker
ﬁxed eﬀects within each areas with de-trended area ﬁxed eﬀects. The correlation between the two is
large at 0.29. Hence, areas where workers with high individual ﬁxed eﬀects work are also areas where
the productivity of labour (after controlling for skills) is high. An immediate implication is that
large spatial wage disparities reﬂect true productivity diﬀerences across areas that are magniﬁed by
the sorting of workers by skills.
13Formally, we have Wt ≡ 1N
∑K
j=1Nj µ̂j +
1
Nt0
∑
i∈t0 δ̂i +
1
Nt0
∑Z
m=1Nm,t0 β̂m,t0 − 1Z
∑Z
m=1 β̂m,t where t0 = 1980
and Z is the number of areas.
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Table 4: Summary statistics for the coeﬃcients estimated in equation (8)
Variable Number of Percentage > 0 Percentage < 0 P90−P10
coeﬃcients at 5% at 5%
area ﬁxed eﬀects (de-trended) 2046 10% 78% 0.16
industry ﬁxed eﬀects 99 58% 33% 0.11
age 1 100% 0% −
squared age 1 0% 100% −
specialisation 99 95% 0% 0.02
share of professionals 99 81% 3% 0.20
industry establishments 99 1% 85% 0.02
For area ﬁxed eﬀects, signiﬁcance is calculated relative to the weighted national mean for the period. For
industry ﬁxed eﬀects, signiﬁcance is calculated relative to the weighted national mean. P90− P10 is the
diﬀerence between the ninth and the ﬁrst decile.
Analysis of the coeﬃcients
Table 4 reports some summary statistics regarding the coeﬃcients of equation (8).14 Note ﬁrst that
88% of the area ﬁxed eﬀects diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the national mean (weighted for the period).
Moreover, this distribution is skewed since only 10% of these area ﬁxed eﬀects are signiﬁcantly higher
than the mean whereas 78% are signiﬁcantly lower. This is because a few populous employment
areas (Paris, its suburbs, and other large French cities) oﬀer signiﬁcantly higher wages than the
national mean.
In line with previous ﬁndings in the literature, we ﬁnd that most specialisation elasticities are
positive and signiﬁcant. The average for all industries is at 2.1%, which is at the lower bound of
the estimates found in the literature (Henderson, 1986; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). The largest
specialisation coeﬃcients are found for business services (3.6%) and for two high-tech industries,
namely medical instruments (3.9%) and artiﬁcial ﬁbres (4.3%). At the other end of the spectrum,
the ﬁve industries with a coeﬃcient not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero are oil reﬁnery, air transport,
tobacco, production of weapons and bullets, and production of steel. Given the reliance of most of
these industries on localised natural advantage (or some localised infrastructure), these results are
not very surprising. The average coeﬃcient on the share of professionals across industries is large at
11.8%. This is in line with the ﬁndings in the literature on human capital externalities (see Rauch,
1993, and his followers). Finally, the elasticity with respect to the number of industry establishments
is on average at −1.4%. This coeﬃcient is highest in industries such as machine tools and various
instrument industries that produce very diﬀerentiated goods. The smallest coeﬃcients are obtained
in industries where instead eﬃcient plant size is expected to be very large like various extractive
industries, naval construction, and energy or water utilities.
14Our identiﬁcation constraints (µ1 = 0 and βParis,1980 = 0) imply that standard Student's tests about the signiﬁ-
cance of the industry and area eﬀects with respect to 0 are not very informative because they depend on the choice
of references. We instead test the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients with respect to their weighted industry mean or their
weighted area mean for a given year. That is, we test the equalities: µk = 1N
∑K
j=1Njµj and βa,t =
1
Nt
∑Z
j=1Nj,tβj,t,
where Nj,t is the number of workers in employment area j in period t, Nt denotes the total number of workers in year
t, Nj is the total number of workers in industry j across all years, K is the number of industries, and Z is the number
of employment areas. These tests can easily be implemented from the estimated coeﬃcients and their covariance
matrix. Directly constraining the mean of all area or industry ﬁxed eﬀects to zero in the estimation would have been
computationally too demanding.
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5 The determinants of area ﬁxed eﬀects: estimation
So far we have assessed the relative importance of `people' versus 'places' to explain spatial wage
disparities. The objective of the second stage of the estimation is to assess the relative importance
of endowments and between-industry interactions in explaining the area-year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Speciﬁcation
The area ﬁxed eﬀects estimated in equation (8) are assumed to be a function of a year ﬁxed eﬀect,
of local interactions between industries, and endowments. The econometric speciﬁcation is:
βa,t = w0 + θt + Ia,tγ + Ea,tα+ υa,t. (10)
where the θt are time ﬁxed-eﬀects and α is a vector of coeﬃcients associated with the endowments
variables, Ea,t. γ is the vector of coeﬃcients associated with local between-industry interactions,
Ia,t. The error terms υa,t that reﬂect local technology shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. across areas
and periods. Finally, we take 1980 as reference so that the coeﬃcient for this year is set to zero.
To capture between-industry interactions, we follow the literature (e.g., Ciccone and Hall, 1996)
and use the log of the density of local employment (logDensity) as main explanatory variable. To
distinguish density eﬀects from pure scale eﬀects, we also use the log of land area (logArea).15 The
diversity of the local composition of economic activity may also matter (Glaeser etal., 1992). To
capture this, we use the log of the inverse of a Herﬁndhal index (logDiversity, which is calculated
as in Table 1). Finally, it could well be that wage diﬀerences across areas are driven by the proximity
to markets for intermediate and ﬁnal goods. These markets may have a spatial scale larger than
employment areas as argued by much of the recent literature (Fujita et al., 1999). Hence, we
also constructed and experimented with a series of market access variables. The one we retained
(logPotential) is the log of the market potential computed from the density of neighbouring areas:
Potentiala,t =
∑
a′ 6=a
Dena′,t
d(a,a′) where d(a, a
′) is the great-circle distance between areas a and a′.
Turning to productive endowments, note that they can raise wages through one of the three
channels highlighted above (lower exporting costs, cheaper supplies, or higher productivity). There
are many possible endowments that may work through these channels. One can think about airports,
high-speed train lines, a favourable climate, closeness to a navigable river or a deep-sea harbour, etc.
However, using a complete set of endowments would raise serious endogeneity concerns (more on
that below). To avoid this, we only considered four (exogenous) endowment variables, the percent-
age of municipalities in each employment area with the following location attributes: a sea shore,
mountains, lakes and water, and `outstanding cultural or architectural heritage' (coming from an
inventory of monuments made by the central government).
This last explanatory variable is of course unlikely to have a direct eﬀect on local productivity.
However, recall that equation (4) shows that the price of non-labour inputs matters in the deter-
mination of local wages. As highlighted ﬁrst by Roback (1982), better consumption amenities (i.e.,
amenities unrelated to production like an architectural heritage) increase the willingness of con-
sumers to pay for land and thus imply higher local land rents. As a result, ﬁrms use relatively less
land. In turn, this lowers the marginal product of labour when land and labour are imperfect substi-
tutes in the production function. Put diﬀerently, wages may capitalise the eﬀect of non-production
15Note that to be consistent we use the log values of the share of employment by industry (in the ﬁrst stage) and of
density and land area (in the second stage). This allows us to estimate the eﬀect of a change in composition of activity
keeping all else constant, a change in population keeping land area and composition constant, and a change in land
area keeping density and composition constant (i.e., an increase in population keeping density constant). The eﬀects
of other changes can be easily computed by summing the coeﬃcients. Alternative speciﬁcations using for instance
industry employment, density, and total employment are certainly possible. However one must be careful with respect
to the interpretation of the coeﬃcients (Combes, 2000).
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variables. Some of these variables are missing in our speciﬁcation as they are not observed. This
is an issue only when such consumption amenities aﬀect an explanatory variable like employment
density  an issue that we discuss in detail below. Otherwise, this only implies more noisy estimates
for the wage eﬀects (as observationally identical employment areas end up paying diﬀerent wages).
Estimation method
Note that equations (8) and (10) constitute the full econometric speciﬁcation. We speak of a two-
stage estimation because in equation (10), the second stage, we use as dependent variable the area
ﬁxed eﬀects estimated in equation (8), the ﬁrst stage. The alternative is to perform a single-stage
estimation and use all the explanatory variables at once.
Such a single-stage estimation is problematic because it does not allow us to compute the variance
of local shocks, υa,t.
16 In turn, we cannot distinguish local shocks from purely idiosyncratic shocks at
the worker level, which is important with missing endowment variables. Moreover, in a single-stage
estimation, the variance of local shocks has to be ignored when computing the covariance matrix
of estimators. As shown by Moulton (1990), this creates large biases in the standard errors for
the estimated coeﬃcients of aggregate explanatory variables.17 Our estimation method avoids these
pitfalls. As robustness check, we nonetheless ran a single-stage estimation and found qualitatively
similar results for estimated coeﬃcients (see Section 6).
Estimation issues
In the estimation of equation (10), note ﬁrst that the true value of the dependent variable, βa,t,
is unknown. We use instead the unbiased and consistent estimators β̂a,t provided by the ﬁrst-
stage results. However, the ﬁxed eﬀects for areas with few workers are less precisely estimated
than those for areas with many workers. Thus, the use of β̂a,t as dependent variable introduces
some heteroscedasticity through sampling errors. This can be dealt with by computing a feasible
generalised least-square (fgls) estimator. The procedure is detailed in Appendix C.
As shown below, the second-stage results using the fgls correction are very close to those
obtained with simpler estimation techniques without any correction. This shows that the eﬀects of
the sampling errors on the coeﬃcients estimated at the second stage are negligible.18 Consequently,
when dealing with endogeneity problems, we will ignore them to keep the econometrics reasonably
simple.
The second main estimation issue is that some local characteristics are likely to be endogenous
to local wages. For instance, employment areas receiving a positive technology shock may attract
migrants. This leads to a positive correlation between the second-stage residuals and the density
of employment. In this particular case, reverse-causality is going to bias the estimates upwards.
Alternatively, as argued above, missing consumption amenities may imply a negative correlation
between employment density and the residuals and thus bias the estimates downwards. Hence,
endogeneity is potentially a serious concern for the second stage of the estimation (and all the more
so since the direction of the bias is unclear).
To deal with this issue, we consider two solutions. Following Ciccone and Hall (1996), the ﬁrst
one is to argue that endogeneity may be caused by `contemporaneous' local shocks. Considering
that these shocks did not have any eﬀect on the distribution of the population in the past, we
can instrument employment density between 1976 and 1998 by long-lagged population variables.
This strategy rests on the hypothesis that population agglomeration in the past is not related to
16This is because (i) the model is projected in the within dimension and (ii) workers can move between areas.
17Alternative approaches like standard robust clustering methods do not work here because the covariance matrix
of error terms is too complex for the reasons already mentioned in the previous footnote.
18This is because we have a very large number of observations with many stayers and large ﬂows of movers between
areas. This allows us to estimate the area-year ﬁxed eﬀects very precisely.
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Table 5: Summary statistics for the variance decomposition  estimation of equation (10)
Simple correlation with:
Eﬀect of Std dev logw 000δ00 β − θ
between-industry interactions (Iγ) 0.077 0.22 0.12 0.90
000density 0.067 0.20 0.12 0.84
000land area 0.024 −0.15 −0.08 −0.62
000diversity 0.002 −0.04 −0.06 −0.31
000market potential 0.036 0.19 0.08 0.78
amenities (Eα) 0.011 −0.10 −0.06 −0.48
residuals (η) 0.029 0.04 −0.08 0.03
2, 221, 156 observations. Variables in the ﬁrst column are all centred around their year mean.
modern diﬀerences in productivity, an hypothesis that is more likely to hold for very long lags. Our
instruments are the log density of urban population in 1831, 1861, 1891, and 1921. We also use the
log market potential calculated using 1831 population data and a peripherality index (the log mean-
distance to all other employment areas). Resting on several instruments (instead of only 1831 urban
population) oﬀers two additional beneﬁts. Since the population is taken in log, using a multiplicity
of census dates is equivalent to instrumenting by past levels and long-run historical growth rates.
Furthermore, having multiple instruments allows us to instrument not only for employment density
but also for the market potential, diversity, and even land area.19 We can also conduct exogeneity
and over-identiﬁcation tests.
The second strategy is to assume that areas have permanent characteristics aﬀecting their pro-
ductivity and introduce area ﬁxed eﬀects in (10). First-diﬀerencing will then remove these ﬁxed
eﬀects together with observed permanent characteristics such as land area and amenities. With
this strategy, contemporaneous shocks may nonetheless bias the results since a rise in productivity
may lead to an increase in employment density. We can then instrument the changes in employment
density (rather than their level). The instruments we use are the same as above since past levels may
drive current growth (be it only through a mean-reversal eﬀect) just like long-run population growth
rates. We also use a bunch of variables from the 1968 population census. These variables refer mostly
to the demographics, average education, composition of employment and state of the housing stock
of each employment area in 1968 (see below for details). If we obtain similar coeﬃcients with these
two strategies, we can be reasonably conﬁdent about our results.
6 The determinants of area ﬁxed eﬀects: results
The importance of employment density
We ﬁrst perform a variance decomposition. The results are reported in Table 5 for the complete ols
regression (i.e., column 3 in Table 6 below). Employment density clearly stands out. Its eﬀect and
that of local ﬁxed eﬀects are very correlated at 0.84. Their standard errors are nearly equal. Market
potential comes second in importance with land area. The explanatory power of the diversity of
local industrial composition and amenity variables is close to nil. This suggests a small explanatory
power for local endowments. It could be that our amenity variables do not capture all endowments
well but the relatively small variance of the second-stage residuals also points at a small explanatory
power for endowments.20
19The reason why land area needs to be instrumented is because areas were deﬁned depending on employment
density so that any bias aﬀecting density is likely to aﬀect land area as well.
20Note that we perform our variance analysis on the complete ols speciﬁcation rather than our preferred speciﬁcation
where interactions variables are instrumented. However the results for the variance analysis on our preferred estimation
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Analysis of the coeﬃcients
The coeﬃcients obtained in the estimation of equation (10) are given in Table 6. The ﬁrst column
reports results for the baseline speciﬁcation where density, land area and diversity are used as
explanatory variables.21 At 3.7%, the coeﬃcient on density is at the lower bound of previous
estimates in the literature (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). This suggests that worker heterogeneity
was captured in part by density in previous work (see Section 7 for more on this). The coeﬃcient on
land area is smaller than that on density by a factor of three. An increase in population through a
higher density has a much larger wage eﬀect than the same population increase obtained by a larger
land area keeping density constant.22
Column 2 in Table 6 performs the same regression as the baseline but uses the fgls correction
discussed above, which corrects for heteroscedasticity. The diﬀerences with the baseline are minimal.
This reﬂects the fact that the area ﬁxed eﬀects are precisely estimated in the ﬁrst stage.
In column 3, we added some controls for productive endowments and amenities (seaside, lake,
mountains and architectural heritage) and market potential to the baseline regression. Comparing
with column 1, the addition of these extra controls slightly lowers the coeﬃcient on density and
increases that on land area. The coeﬃcient on the diversity of the composition of activity becomes
negative and signiﬁcant. Among the added variables, the coeﬃcient on market potential is positive
and highly signiﬁcant. Its magnitude is comparable to that on density. If the market potential of an
area doubles (e.g., employment density doubles in all other areas) wages increase by 3.5%. Turning
to the four amenity variables, recall that they can have both a direct eﬀect as productive endowments
and an indirect eﬀect of opposite sign as consumption amenities (through land prices aﬀecting the
quantity of land used by ﬁrms and thus the marginal product of labour). We expect the presence
of an outstanding heritage to have a minimal direct productive eﬀect and a much larger amenity
eﬀect. This is what we observe. The same holds for the presence of a lake for which the productivity
beneﬁts are also likely to be very small. The coeﬃcients on sea and mountains are positive. In the
case of the sea variable, the positive productivity eﬀect slightly dominates the amenity eﬀect. The
case of mountains is more ambiguous since the expected sign of both the direct and indirect eﬀects
is unclear. In any case, note that the net eﬀects for all four variables are signiﬁcant but small.
Column 4 is our preferred speciﬁcation. Density, land area, diversity and market potential are
instrumented by long-lagged population variables dating back to 1831 and the peripherality of the
area. Comparing the results to the previous column, endogeneity appears to be a serious concern.
It can be noted ﬁrst that the coeﬃcient on density decreases again. Our coeﬃcient on density,
at 3.0%, is below most estimates in the literature, which are in the 4 − 8% range. To repeat, the
major reason for this diﬀerence is the failure of previous literature to control properly for unobserved
individual heterogeneity. After instrumenting, the coeﬃcient on land area becomes insigniﬁcant. It
turns out that the endogeneity bias is much larger for this variable. Similarly, after instrumenting,
the coeﬃcient on market potential also declines from 3.5 to 2.4%. Overall we ﬁnd that endogeneity
is a more serious concern than previously concluded. In part, this is because we consider more
are very similar. The standard deviations for the eﬀects of employment density and market potential decrease slightly
but the standard deviation for all interaction eﬀects (when jointly considered) is unchanged.
21It is likely that employment density does not aﬀect all industries with the same intensity (Henderson, 2003). The
two-step estimation prevents us from exploring this issue further. We leave it for future work.
22When using the same variables directly in equation (8) to perform a single-stage estimation (whose results are
available upon request), we ﬁnd very similar values for the eﬀects of industry characteristics. The average coeﬃcient
of industry specialisation is 2.2% (against 2.1% in the two-stage estimation). The coeﬃcient on employment density
is also very close: 3.2% (against 3.7% in the two-stage estimation). That on land area shows a larger discrepancy
at 2.1% (against 1.1%). The insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on industrial diversity changes sign. These diﬀerences between
the two-stage and single-stage estimations ﬁnd their sources in the correlations between the individual explanatory
variables and the aggregate error terms (recall that the error structure in the two-step estimation diﬀers from that of
a single step estimation). In any case, the explanatory power of both land area and diversity remains small so that
these changes in the coeﬃcients do not alter our conclusions.
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Table 6: Estimation results for equation (10)
(1) Levels (2) Levels (3) Levels (4) Levels (5) First-Dif (6) First-Dif
Regression ols 1 fgls ols 2 2sls ols 2sls
logDensity 0.0371a 0.0357a 0.0322a 0.0302a 0.0349a 0.0289
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0063) (0.0043) (0.0175)
logArea 0.0113a 0.0106a 0.0218a 0.0041 - -
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0154)
logDiversity 0.0020 0.0006 −0.0046b −0.0407c −0.0047 −0.0296
(0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0208) (0.0032) (0.0200)
logPotential 0.0351a 0.0244a 0.1385a 0.1427c
(0.0014) (0.0042) (0.0474) (0.0715)
Sea 0.0111a 0.0004 - -
(0.0033) (0.0046)
Mountain 0.0333a 0.0209a - -
(0.0032) (0.0041)
Lake −0.0254a −0.0263a - -
(0.0054) (0.0088)
Heritage −0.0091b −0.0202a - -
(0.0043) (0.0068)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 (within time) 60% - 72% - - -
2, 046 observations. Standard error between brackets. c: signiﬁcant at 10%, b: signiﬁcant at
5%, and a: signiﬁcant at 1%. In column 4, density, land area, and diversity are instrumented by
urban population density in 1831, 1861, 1891, and 1921 together with market potential computed
using 1831 urban population data and mean distances to other areas. The R2 for the instrumental
regressions are 0.64 for density, 0.35 for area, 0.17 for diversity, and 0.92 for market potential.
A test of overidentifying restrictions shows that our instruments are valid even at a 10% level.
Diversity and market potential are clearly endogenous while density and land area are only marginally
exogenous. In column 6, we instrument the changes in log density, log diversity and log area with
the same variables as in column 4 plus a set of variables from the 1968 population census: mean age,
mean age when leaving education, shares of the diﬀerent occupational groups, share of population
born in France, share of workers employed in the public sector, share of population living in an
accommodation with hot water, with ﬂushing toilet, with toilet inside, share of people living in a
'normal accommodation' (apartment or house as opposed to second residence, ﬂat-share, etc), and
mean deterioration of accommodation. The R2 for the instrumental regressions are 0.35 for changes
in density, 0.05 for changes in diversity, and 0.89 for changes in market potential.
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variables (density, land area, diversity, and market potential) and more instruments than previous
work. This may also be caused by the fact that French employment areas are rather small so that
the eﬀects of local shocks are easier to pick up.
In column 5, we report the results for a simple ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimation. Interestingly, the
results are not very diﬀerent from those of Column 3. The main exception is the coeﬃcient for
market potential, for which the standard error is much larger. This suggests that controlling for
permanent unobserved characteristics of employment areas does not aﬀect much the results. In
column 6, when instrumenting the changes in density, diversity and market potential, we ﬁnd again
results close to those of our iv regression in levels (column 4). The coeﬃcient on density is just below
3% while that on diversity is also negative. The coeﬃcient on market potential remains positive
with again a large standard error. Furthermore, our instruments for the ﬁrst diﬀerences are weak
(and we consequently do not give much weight to the results in this column).
Residual spatial wage disparities
To examine spatial wage disparities, we can now compute a 'residual wage', that is a local wage
controlling for skills and all interactions, from the results of the baseline regression for the second
stage. We can deﬁne such index wresid,a,t (or residual wage) as:
logwresid,a,t ≡W + η̂a,t, (11)
where W is deﬁned in a similar way as after equation (9). This residual wage corresponds to the
local wage obtained by an `average' worker employed in an `average' industry and in an area with
`average' interactions.
The diﬀerence between highest and the lowest residual wage divided by the lowest residual wage
across all employment areas is 0.23 instead of 0.38 for the de-trended net wage (i.e., the wage after
controlling for skills and industry) and 0.74 for the de-trended mean wage. The same ratio for the
ﬁrst and the last decile is 0.07 instead of 0.14 and 0.21 for net and mean wages, respectively. For
the ﬁrst and last quartile, we ﬁnd 0.04, 0.06 and 0.11 for residual, net, and mean wages respectively.
Finally, the coeﬃcient of variation for residual wages is 0.03 against 0.05 for net wages and 0.08 for
mean wages. The salient result is thus that once skills and interactions are controlled for, about two
thirds of the wage disparities between employment areas disappear.
7 Aggregate wage diﬀerences across employment areas
Research is often restricted in the data it can use. Existing studies on regional disparities typically
use mean wages (or output per worker) by industry and location. It is of course impossible to directly
implement our micro-founded speciﬁcations (8) and (10) with aggregate data. In this section, we ﬁrst
show how the simple model introduced above (where wages are determined at the worker level) can
be aggregated and estimated at the level of each employment area and industry. We then compare
the aggregate data results with those obtained above using individual data.
Aggregation issues
Once we abstract from the longitudinal dimension of the panel, and in absence of information
about education, we can use the information about occupations (self-employed, professional, skilled,
unskilled white-collar, unskilled blue-collar) to proxy for skills. Since occupations may change over
time, we assume that worker ﬁxed eﬀects are such that δi =
∑
k,c di,k,c,tδc,k + ιi,t where di,k,c,t is an
occupation dummy taking value one when worker i is in occupation c and industry k at date t, δc,k
is the corresponding coeﬃcient, and ιi,t is a residual term. Averaging (7) over all Na,k,t workers in
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the same local industry (a, k) in year t yields:
logwa,k,t = 1Na,k,t
∑
i∈(a,k,t)
logwi,t = βa,t + µk,t + Ia,k,tγk + 1Na,k,t
∑
i∈(a,k,t)
(
Xi,tϕ+ di,k,c,tδc(i,t),k
)
+ ςa,k,t,
(12)
where ςa,k,t = 1Na,k,t
∑
i∈(a,k,t)(i,t + ιi,t).
If there is some sorting across space or industries that leads the mean of the residual term ιi,t to
be correlated with some of the explanatory variables at the (a, k, t) level, the estimated coeﬃcients
are biased. This is a ﬁrst major limitation when using aggregate data. Another aggregation problem
in equation (12) regards data availability. Typically, one may have access to the mean wage in an
industry and area but not to the mean of log-wages. Hence the mean of log-wages must be proxied
by the log of mean wages. A similar problem arises among the explanatory variables when using (as
we do) the squared age of workers. Again the mean of squared individual ages requires individual
level data. With aggregate data, it can only be proxied by the square of the mean age. This implies
some measurement problems for wages and squared age.23
We can again centre within-industry interactions and worker time-varying characteristics so that
all systematic industry components can be brought together with the industry ﬁxed eﬀect.24 We
obtain: {
logwa,k,t = µk + βa,t + I˜a,k,tγk + X˜a,k,tϕ+
∑
c q˜c,a,k,tδc,k + ςa,k,t,
βa,t = w0 + θt + Ea,tα+ Ia,tγ + υa,t.
(13)
These two equations mirror equations (8) and (10). As argued above, the share of workers in
professional occupations in industry and employment areas should be used as one of the regressors
in the vector I˜a,k,t to capture human capital interactions within industries. However this variable also
now appears independently in equation (13) following the aggregation of individual skills. Hence the
coeﬃcient on the share of professionals captures both skill composition eﬀects and local interactions
in the industry. The two cannot be separately identiﬁed. This constitutes another limitation of
aggregate data. Finally, the ﬁrst stage equation must be estimated by weighting each observation
by the square-root of its number of workers to avoid heteroscedasticity (Coelho and Ghali, 1973).
Turning to the second stage (and as previously), we do not know the true values of the area ﬁxed
eﬀects, βa,t. Hence, we use β̂a,t rather than βa,t keeping a similar estimation method as before (again
see Appendix C). We also impose the same identiﬁcation conditions: µ1 = 0 and θ1980 = 0.
Results
At the aggregate level, we perform the two-stage estimation using all the twenty years of data
available as we are not limited by sample size. The ﬁrst stage of the regression with all the variables
(7, 514 in total) has a R2 of 81% compared with 31% for the same regression with individual data
without the worker ﬁxed eﬀects. This diﬀerence is obviously explained by the considerable variation
in individual wages that is averaged out by aggregation.
As with individual data, we then perform a detailed variance analysis of the ﬁrst stage of the
estimation. The main ﬁnding is that the eﬀect of all the explanatory variables we consider is much
larger than previously.25 With respect to the share of the various occupations, a higher explanatory
23However, these measurement problems are very minor. The correlations between mean-log-wage and log-mean-
wage by industry and location and between mean-squared-age and squared-mean-age by location are both 0.99.
24Deﬁne the centred share of occupation c in (a, k, t): q˜c,a,k,t ≡ qc,a,k,t − qc,.,k,t where qc,a,k,t ≡
1
Na,k,t
∑
i∈(a,k,t) di,k,c,t is the share of occupation c in (a, k, t) and qc,,k,t its weighted mean across all employment
areas. To mirror the approach developed in Section 4, we assume µk,t + I,k,tγk +X,k,tϕ+
∑
c qc,,k,tδc,k = µk + ρt,
that is the sum of all the industry eﬀects can be decomposed into a time-invariant industry eﬀect and a time eﬀect
(which is again normalised to zero).
25The standard deviation for the wages is at 0.258 (against 0.367 with individual data). The standard deviation for
the de-trended area ﬁxed eﬀect is at 0.074 (against 0.065). That for the eﬀect of age and its square is unchanged at
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Table 7: Estimation results for the second stage of equation (13)
(1) Levels (2) Levels (3) Levels (4) Levels (5) First-Dif (6) First-Dif
Regression ols 1 fgls ols 2 2sls ols 2sls
logDensity 0.0625a 0.0618a 0.0584a 0.0562a 0.0336a −0.0281
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0274)
logArea 0.0344a 0.0359a 0.0419a 0.0245b - -
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0100)
logDiversity 0.0007 −0.0008 −0.0033a −0.0507a −0.027 −0.0588
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0136) (0.0021) (0.0301)
logPotential 0.0279a 0.0192a −0.0627 0.2527b
(0.0008) (0.0027) (0.0474) (0.1259)
Sea 0.0151a 0.0059b - -
(0.0020) (0.0029)
Mountain 0.0435a 0.0307a - -
(0.0019) (0.0026)
Lake −0.0143a −0.0154a - -
(0.0033) (0.0055)
Heritage −0.0266a −0.0389a - -
(0.0027) (0.0042)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 (within time) 77% - 82% - - -
6, 820 observations. Standard error between brackets. c: signiﬁcant at 10%, b: signiﬁcant at 5%,
and a: signiﬁcant at 1%. In columns 4, density, land area, and diversity are instrumented by urban
population density in 1831, 1861, 1891, and 1921 together with market potential computed using
1831 data and mean distances to other areas. The R2 for the instrumental regressions are 0.64 for
density, 0.35 for area, 0.17 for diversity, and 0.92 for market potential. A test of overidentifying
restrictions shows that instruments are valid at 5%. All our instrumented variables are endogenous
at 5%. In column 6, we instrument the changes in log density, log diversity and log area with the
same variables as in column 4 plus a set of variables from the 1968 population census: mean age,
mean age when leaving education, shares of the diﬀerent occupational groups, share of population
born in France, share of workers employed in the public sector, share of population living in an
accommodation with hot water, with ﬂushing toilet, with toilet inside, share of people living in a
'normal accommodation' (apartment or house as opposed to second residence, ﬂat-share, etc), and
mean deterioration of accommodation. The R2 for the instrumental regressions are 0.35 for changes
in density, 0.05 for changes in diversity, and 0.89 for changes in market potential.
Table 8: Correlation between the eﬀects of the variables after aggregation by area and year
area f.-e. density area diversity market potential residuals (agg)
mean worker f.-e. 0.29 0.44 0.22 −0.01− 0.17 −0.10−
area f.-e. 1 0.77 0.34 −0.23− 0.62 0.56
density 1 0.58 −0.21− 0.52 0.02
land area 1 0.25 0.49 −0.39−
diversity 1 −0.10− −0.42−
market potential 1 0.04
2, 046 observations computed from the estimations at the individual level (using column 4 of Table 6). Area
ﬁxed eﬀects are estimated from (8) and we subtracted time ﬁxed eﬀects estimated from (10). Worker ﬁxed
eﬀects are estimated from (8) and then averaged by employment area. The eﬀects of density, land area and
diversity are computed using their coeﬃcients as estimated in (10) times the value of the variable.
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power was to be expected given that these variables now capture both the skill composition of the
local industry and some interactions therein. For the other variables (specialisation in particular),
this indicates that some correlation with individual unobserved heterogeneity is present.
As can be seen from Table 7, the same conclusion arises with the second stage of the regression.
The R2 (within time) of the second stage of the baseline regression is well above what we obtained
with individual data at 77% (against 60%). Hence when workers' unobserved heterogeneity is not
controlled for, some of it is captured by aggregate variables.
Consistent with the previous ﬁnding, we also ﬁnd that the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients are much higher
than with individual data. Because they capture within-industry interactions together with compo-
sitional eﬀects, the coeﬃcients on the share of professionals are much higher than with individual
data. More interestingly the specialisation coeﬃcients are also much higher: on average 4.3% against
2.1%. Similar discrepancies occur with regard to the second stage coeﬃcients (see Table 7). In the
most basic speciﬁcation (column 1), the coeﬃcient on density is at 6.3% instead of 3.7% with in-
dividual data. That on land area is at 3.4% against 1.1% with individual data. In the aggregate
data equivalent of our preferred speciﬁcation (column 4), we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on employment
density is still at 5.6% against 3.0% with individual data.
As can be seen from Table 8, the discrepancies between estimations with aggregate and individual
data are easily explained by the sorting of workers by skills. We have already underlined in Section
4 that the correlation between the average worker ﬁxed eﬀect by area and the de-trended area-year
ﬁxed eﬀect at 0.29 is high in individual regressions. It is even higher (0.53) when the area-year ﬁxed
eﬀects are computed on aggregate data. In conclusion, when sorting is not taken into account the
coeﬃcient on density is over-estimated by nearly 100%, that on land area is over-estimated by up to
several orders of magnitude whereas those on specialisation are also over-estimated by 100%. These
are clearly large biases.
8 Concluding comments
This paper proposes a general framework to investigate the sources of wage disparities across local
labour markets: skills, endowments and within- and between-industry interactions. This framework
unites diﬀerent strands of literature that were so far mostly disjoint. It shows that the research about
the `estimation of agglomeration economies' is closely intertwined with those dealing with `regional
disparities', `local labour markets' and 'migration'. Empirically, the main novelty of the paper is to
use a very large panel of workers and a consistent approach to exploit it. This allows us to assess
precisely the eﬀects of unobserved worker heterogeneity. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of individual skills
is quantitatively very important in the data. Up to half of the spatial wage disparities can be traced
back to diﬀerences in the skill composition of the workforce. Workers with better labour market
characteristics tend to agglomerate in the larger, denser and more skilled local labour market. We
believe more work is now needed to understand the nature of this sorting.26
We also pay considerable attention to the issues of simultaneity. When correcting for possible
biases, our estimates for economies of density, at around 3.0%, are lower than in previous literature.
Nonetheless, economies of density still play an important role in explaining diﬀerences in local wages.
0.058, that for industry ﬁxed eﬀects is at 0.097 (against 0.043), that for specialisation is at 0.047 (against 0.017), and
that for the number of establishments is at 0.035 (against 0.019). Finally with aggregate data the standard deviation
for the share of professionals is four times as large at 0.046 (against 0.011). The eﬀect of all the occupations has a
standard deviation equal to 0.110.
26One explanation could be based on a self-selection eﬀect in internal migrations. As suggested long ago by
Alfred Marshall, it may be that "the most enterprising, the most highly gifted, those with the highest physique
and strongest character go [to the large towns] to ﬁnd scope for their abilities" (Marshall, 1890). Nocke (2006)
proposes a formalisation of this argument. Alternatively, the largest cities may oﬀer some particular amenities that
appeal more to the workers commanding the highest wages. A third hypothesis (Glaeser and Maré, 2001; Wheeler,
2006) is that workers may learn more in larger cities.
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We ﬁnd that the market potential also matters. The evidence on other types of local interactions
such as those taking place within particular industries is more mixed. They are signiﬁcant but do
not matter much quantitatively in explaining local wages disparities. Our approach also suggests at
best a modest direct role for local non-human endowments in the determination of local wages.
20
Appendix A Data description and background
A detailed description of the wage data can be found in the working paper version of this article
and in Abowd et al. (1999). A detailed description of French employment areas appears in Combes
(2000) and in our working paper (Combes et al, 2004). Finally, Cohen et al (1997) provide some
background about wage setting in France as well as international comparisons. In this appendix, we
brieﬂy describe our treatment of the data.
 Missing years. Three years (1981, 1983 and 1990) are missing due to lack of sampling by insee
during census periods.
 Wages, earnings and labour costs. For each observation, and using total net nominal earnings,
number of days worked and work status (full-time or part-time), we computed an annualised
nominal wage. We then added mandatory payroll taxes for both employees and employers
(which diﬀer over time, across wage levels, work status, and for textile workers) to obtain total
annualised labour costs.
 Imputed wages. The original data contains imputed wages for some workers and missing
years. Starting with 19, 675, 740 observations, we deleted all imputed values and ended up
with 18, 581, 470 observations.
 Missing values and coding errors. We deleted all the observations for which one or more
variables of interest was missing, the duration of employment was equal to zero, wages are
negative, or workers were not born in October of even years. After these deletions, we were
left with 17, 495, 335 observations. We also deleted all the observations for which we could not
determine the industry of employment or the employment area. This left us with 16, 458, 989
observations.
 Mainland private sector employees of working age. We excluded all apprentices and workers
not employed in the private sector. We also restricted the sample to workers aged 15 to 65
employed in mainland France. Workers employed in Corsica and overseas territories were
deleted to end up with 14, 067, 326 observations.
 Part-timers. Because the number of hours is unknown before 1993, we excluded all part-time
workers. In case of multiple observations for a worker over a given year (corresponding to more
than one job), we kept only one observation (the one with the most working days). This left
us with 10, 551, 810 observations.
 Excluded industries. We use a sectoral classiﬁcation with 114 industries. Agriculture and
ﬁshing industries are not normally covered by the extract. Remaining workers in these sectors
were excluded. We also excluded all industries with less than 500 observations over the period
(Spatial transport, Extraction of uranium, and Extraction of metals). In a few industries,
ﬁrms with a large number of establishments can aggregate their reporting at the regional
level. We excluded these industries (Financial intermediation, Insurance, Financial auxiliaries,
Telecommunications, and Postal services). Finally, we also excluded a few non-competitive
industries (Public administration, Extra-territorial activities, and Associations). We ended up
with 9, 389, 838 observations across 99 industries.
 Outliers. The initial data had a number of outliers with wages either unrealistically high or
well below the minimum wage. These seem to be caused by reporting mistakes in the net
nominal earnings or in the number of working days. We decided to get rid of the 3% lowest
and highest wages for every year.
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The ﬁnal sample contains 8, 826, 422 observations. When working with the 6 years we selected (1976,
1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996), the sample contains 2, 664, 474 observations. When we aggregate
the data by area, industry, and year we have 378, 022 observations for the 1976-1998 period.
Appendix B Endogeneity of location and industry choices
We examine here the necessary assumptions about migrations and workers ﬂows between industries
for the strict exogeneity of the industry and location of employment to be warranted.
Consider worker i having to choose an employment area and an industry in a static framework.
We assume that this worker's utility depends only on her level of consumption of a composite good
whose price is the same everywhere. Indirect utility can then be written as a function of the wage:
v = v(w). Worker i chooses her employment area and industry so as to maximise her wages net of
the (monetary) costs of migration. This choice can be decomposed in three steps.
1. At the beginning of period t, any industry k in an employment area a can be characterised by
a wage wi,a,k,t. This wage depends not only on individual attributes and local characteristics
of the industry, but also on a shock noted ψi,a,k,t. Using (4) and (5), the wage satisﬁes:
logwi,a,k,t = logBa,k,t +Xi,tϕ+ δi + ψi,a,k,t. (B 1)
We assume that all the explanatory variables in Ba,k,t and Xi,t are strictly exogenous.
2. The worker then chooses an employment area a(i, t) and an industry k(i, t) so as to maximise
her utility. Assume ﬁrst that the worker knows the distribution of the shocks ψi,a,k,t without
knowing their exact values. The maximisation programme of the worker is then:
max
(a,k)∈t
Eψi,a,k,t [v (wi,a,k,t − ca,k)] , (B 2)
where Eψi,a,k,t is the expectation operator on the distribution of ψi,a,k,t, and ca,k is a mobility
cost equal to zero when a = a(i, t−1) and k = k(i, t−1). In this case, the choice of a(i, t) and
k(i, t) is independent from the realisation of i,t = ψi,a(i,t),k(i,t),t. The location and industry of
employment are thus determined solely on the basis of exogenous variables entering the wage
equation and the mobility costs. Hence, when the worker knows only the distribution of the
shocks, the assumption of strict exogeneity is satisﬁed.
Turning now to the case where the worker can observe all the ψi,a,k,t, the maximisation pro-
gramme is:
max
(a,k)∈t
[v (wi,a,k,t − ca,k)] . (B 3)
In this case, the choice of a(i, t) and k(i, t) is correlated with the realisation of all shocks ψi,a,k,t,
and in particular i,t = ψi,a(i,t),k(i,t),t. Hence, the assumption of strict heterogeneity of location
and industry choice does not hold.
There are ﬁnally intermediate cases for which only some ψi,a,k,t are observed by the worker.
If these observed shocks are not correlated with i,t, the exogeneity assumption is satisﬁed. If
they are, the model is misspeciﬁed again.
3. After choosing an employment area and industry, the individual shock, i,t, is known and the
worker is paid according to (7). The worker then faces the same decision at period t+ 1.
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In a dynamic framework
Consider for simplicity that the explanatory variables other than area-year and industry dummies,
noted Yiτ , are strictly exogenous. We also ignore savings. At period t, the worker chooses her
location and industry taking into account all available information including the observed shocks
ψi,a,k,t and their past evolution. We introduce the following notations: Y
t
i = {Yiτ}τ6t and ψti =
{ψi,a,k,τ |a 6 Z, k 6 K, τ 6 t, ψi,a,k,τ known by i}. The vector of state variables at the beginning
of period t is
(
ψt−1i , a(i, t− 1), k(i, t− 1)
)
. Past employment area a(i, t− 1) and industry k(i, t− 1)
enter this vector because mobility costs can depend on them. The history of observed shocks ψt−1i is
included because it can be used to predict the current and future realisations of shocks. The sequences
of expected locations and industries are noted {a(i, τ)}t6τ6T and {k(i, τ)}t6τ6T , respectively, with
T the last period of work for i. Any worker solves:
max
(at,kt)∈t,...,(aT ,kT )∈T
E
[
T∑
τ=t
ρτv (wi,aτ ,kτ ,τ − caτ ,kτ )
∣∣Y ti , ψt−1i , Z(i, t− 1), K(i, t− 1)
]
, (B 4)
with ρ the discount rate.
We can reach diﬀerent conclusions depending on the dynamic process determining the shocks ψi,a,k,t.
If we ﬁrst suppose that shocks are idiosyncratic, the same conclusions as in the static case apply.
The location a(i, t) and the industry k(i, t) are correlated with i,t if and only if the worker can
collect information on i,t at period t. If we suppose instead that shocks follow an AR(1) process
and that the worker can obtain some information on i,t through her history of shocks ψ
t−1
i , then
three issues arise:
1. The location a(i, t) and the industry k(i, t) are correlated with i,t. This correlation is however
weaker than in the static case because workers take into account future wages in their mobility
decisions. Indeed, the information related to current shock present in future wage shocks is
decreasing with the time horizon and becomes negligible when it grows arbitrarily large.
2. a(i, t) and k(i, t) are correlated with past shocks {i,τ}τ<t as shocks follow an AR(1) process.
3. a(i, t) and k(i, t) are correlated with future shocks {i,τ}τ>t. However, the predictive power
of the information set at t decreases over time. Thus, the worker can form only inaccurate
expectations about future shocks. Thus the correlation between a(i, t) and k(i, t) in the one
hand, and iτ , for τ > t, in the other hand, decreases when τ increases.
These three remarks suggest that the results may be biased because the explanatory variables
can be correlated not only with present shocks, but also with past and future shocks. However,
although we may have more sources of bias than in the static case, these correlations are likely
to be weak because workers take future wages into account in their mobility decision while having
little information about future shocks. Extensions to other dynamic processes for the shocks are
straightforward.
Appendix C Two-stage estimation
What follows is a complete description of our two-stage estimation procedure.
Equation (10) can be re-written compactly:
β = DΦ+ η, (C 5)
where β = (β1,1, ..., βZ,T )′, Φ = (w0, θ1, ..., θT , γ)′, D is the matrix of all aggregate explanatory
variables after vectorisation, and η = (η1,1, ..., ηZ,T )′.
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An area-year ﬁxed eﬀect is set arbitrarily to zero to secure identiﬁcation. Because the exact value of
the area ﬁxed eﬀects is unknown, this equation cannot be directly estimated with ols. It is however
possible to compute a consistent and unbiased estimator of β from the ﬁrst stage results. Note ﬁrst
that (C 5) can be transformed into:
β̂ = DΦ+ η +Ψ, (C 6)
where β̂ = (β̂1,1,...,β̂Z,T )′ is the estimator of β obtained in the ﬁrst stage of the regression (with
β̂1,1 set to zero for convenience) and Ψ = β̂ − β is a sampling error. Equation (C 6) can then be
estimated in the following way:
1. Compute the ols estimate of Φ from (C 6):
Φ̂OLS = (D′D)−1D′β̂ = Φ+ (D′D)−1D′(η +Ψ) (C 7)
2. It is then possible to deﬁne σ̂2 such that:
σ̂2 =
1
tr(MD)
{(
η̂ +Ψ
)′ (
η̂ +Ψ
)
− tr
[
V̂ (Ψ |Ω)
]}
, (C 8)
where MD = I − D (D′D)−1D′, η̂ +Ψ = β̂ − DΦ̂OLS = MD(η + Ψ), Ω is the set of all
explanatory variables in the model, and V̂ (Ψ |Ω) is the estimator of the covariance matrix
obtained from the ﬁrst stage estimation bordered with zeros in the ﬁrst line and ﬁrst column.
As shown by Gobillon (2004), σ̂2 is an unbiased estimator of σ2 when η is orthogonal to . It
is also consistent under some reasonable assumptions.
3. We can now compute an unbiased estimator of the covariance matrix V (η +Ψ |Ω):
V̂ = σ̂2I + V̂ (Ψ |Ω) . (C 9)
4. Measurement errors on the dependant variable create some heteroscedasticity. To control for
this, the feasible generalised least-square (fgls) estimator of Φ can be computed. It is given
by:
Φ̂FGLS =
(
D′V̂ −1D
)−1
D′V̂ −1β̂. (C 10)
5. Finally, it is possible to compute a consistent estimator of the variance of Φ̂FGLS :
V̂
(
Φ̂FGLS |Ω
)
=
(
D′V̂ −1D
)−1
. (C 11)
24
References
J. M. Abowd, F. Kramarz, D. N. Margolis, High wage workers and high wage ﬁrms, Econometrica
67 (2) (1999) 251333.
A. Ciccone, Agglomeration eﬀects in Europe, European Economic Review 46 (2) (2002) 213227.
A. Ciccone, R. E. Hall, Productivity and the density of economic activity, American Economic
Review 86 (1) (1996) 5470.
P. R. Coelho, M. A. Ghali, The end of the North-South wage diﬀerential: Reply, American Economic
Review 63 (4) (1973) 757762.
D. Cohen, A. Lefranc, G. Saint-Paul, French unemployment: A transatlantic perspective, Economic
Policy: A European Forum 0 (25) (1997) 265285.
P.-P. Combes, Economic structure and local growth: France, 19841993, Journal of Urban Economics
47 (3) (2000) 329355.
P.-P. Combes, G. Duranton, L. Gobillon, Spatial wage disparities: Sorting matters!, Discussion
Paper 4240, cepr (2004).
G. B. Dahl, Mobility and the return to education: Testing a Roy model with multiple markets,
Econometrica 70 (6) (2002) 23672420.
G. Duranton, V. Monastiriotis, Mind the gaps: The evolution of regional earnings inequalities in the
UK 19821997, Journal of Regional Science 42 (2) (2002) 219256.
G. Duranton, D. Puga, Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies, in: V. Henderson, J.-F.
Thisse (eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, volume 4. North-Holland, Amsterdam,
2004, pp. 20632117.
S. N. Durlauf, D. T. Quah, The new empirics of economic growth, in: J. B. Taylor, M. Woodford
(eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics volume 1A, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1999, pp. 231304.
M. Fujita, P. R. Krugman, A. J. Venables, The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International
Trade, MIT Press, Cambridge, ma, 1999.
R. Gibbons, L. Katz, Does unmeasured ability explain inter-industry wage diﬀerentials?, Review
of Economic Studies 59 (3) (1992) 515535.
E. L. Glaeser, H. Kallal, J. A. Scheinkman, A. Schleifer, Growth in cities, Journal of Political
Economy 100 (6) (1992) 11261152.
E. L. Glaeser, D. C. Maré, Cities and skills, Journal of Labor Economics 19 (2) (2001) 316342.
L. Gobillon, The estimation of cluster eﬀects in linear panel model, processed, ined (2004).
L. Gobillon, D. Le Blanc, Migrations, income and skills, working Paper 2003-47, crest-insee (2003).
J. V. Henderson, Eﬃciency of resource usage and city size, Journal of Urban Economics 19 (1) (1986)
4770.
J. V. Henderson, Marshall's economies, Journal of Urban Economics 53 (1) (2003) 128.
A. B. Krueger, L. H. Summers, Eﬃciency wages and the inter-industry wage structure, Econometrica
56 (2) (1988) 259293.
25
A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, Macmillan, London, 1890.
E. Moretti, Human capital externalities in cities, in: V. Henderson, J.-F. Thisse (eds.), Handbook
of Regional and Urban Economics, volume 4, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 2004, pp. 22432291.
B. R. Moulton, An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the eﬀects of aggregate variables on micro
units, Review of Economics and Statistics 72 (2) (1990) 334338.
V. Nocke, A gap for me: Entrepreneurs and entry, Journal of the European Economic Association
4 (5) (2006) 929956.
J. E. Rauch, Productivity gains from geographic concentration of human capital: Evidence from the
cities, Journal of Urban Economics 34 (3) (1993) 380400.
J. Roback, Wages, rents and the quality of life, Journal of Political Economy 90 (6) (1982), 1257
1278.
S. S. Rosenthal, W. C. Strange, Evidence on the nature and sources of agglomeration economies,
in: V. Henderson, J.-F. Thisse (eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, volume 4,
North-Holland, Amsterdam, 2004, pp. 21192171.
J. Temple, The new growth evidence, Journal of Economic Literature 37 (1) (1999) 112156.
R. H. Topel, Local labor markets, Journal of Political Economy 94 (3(2)) (1986) S111S143.
W. H. Wheeler, Cities and the growth of wages among young workers: Evidence from the NLSY,
Journal of Urban Economics 60 (2) (2006) 162184.
26
